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ABSTRACT:	Twenty	years	after	its	foundation,	MERCOSUR	has	failed	to	meet	its	declared	
goals.	Far	from	being	a	common	market	and	not	yet	a	customs	union,	it	has	neither	deepened	
nor	(legally)	enlarged.	All	 the	other	regionalist	projects	 in	Latin	America	fare	even	worse,	
although	 they	 have	 arguably	 fostered	 domestic	 democracy,	 economic	 reforms	 and	 more	
peaceful	regional	relations.	This	paper	introduces	a	conceptual	toolkit	for	comparing	regional	
integration,	 and	 then	 applies	 it	 to	 explain	 the	 dispersed	 goals	 and	 declining	 performance	
of	 the	Latin	American	experiences.	The	aim	 is	 to	 show	how	 the	 strengthening	of	national	
sovereignty	–	as	opposed	to	its	pooling	or	delegation	–	is	at	the	heart	of	most	contemporary	
regionalist strategies. 
KEYWORDS: Comparative regional integration, regionalism, LatinAmerica, Mercosur.
RESUMEN:	Veinte	 años	 después	 de	 su	 fundación,	MERCOSUR	 ha	 fallado	 en	 alcanzar	
sus objetivos declarados. Lejos de ser un mercado común todavía no es una unión aduanera 
y	 tampoco	 	 ha	 podido	 profundizar	 (legalmente)	 su	 ampliación.	Todos	 los	 otros	 proyectos	
regionalistas	 en	América	 Latina	 lo	 hacen	 aún	 peor,	 aunque	 puedan	 argumentar	 que	 han	
promovido	la	democracia,	reformas	económicas	y	unas	relaciones	regionales	más	pacíficas.	
En este artículo se introduce un marco conceptual para comparar los procesos de integración 
regional,	para	luego	aplicarlo	a	fin	de	explicar	por	que	la	diversidad	de	objetivos		ha	repercutido	
en	 unos	 resultados	 cada	 vez	menores	 en	 la	 experiencia	 latinoamericana.	 	 El	 propósito	 es	
mostrar de qué manera el fortalecimiento de las soberanías nacionales –  que se opone a que 
éstas sean compartidas o delegadas –    constituye el punto medular de la mayor parte de 
estrategias regionalistas. 
PALABRAS	 CLAVE:	 Integración regional comparativa, regionalismo, América Latina, 
Mercosur.
	Conceptual	Issues	and	The	Latin	American	Experiences
(Regionalismo Sobrepuesto, Sin Integración: 
Cuestiones	Conceptuales	y	Experiencias	Latinoamericanas)
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Introduction
In	 the	 1960s,	 the	 first	 wave	 of	 Latin	
American	 integration	was	partly	 fostered	by	
the	rising	threat	of	a	fortress Europe and	the	
need	to	join	forces	to	confront	it.	In	the	1990s,	
however,	 the	 European	 Union	 (EU)	 had	
become	both	a	model	and	a	partner	for	a	new	
wave	of	regional	organizations	that	included,	
prominently,	 the	Andean	Community	 (CAN	
according	 to	 its	 Spanish	 acronym)	 and	 the	
Common	 Market	 of	 the	 South	 (Mercosur).	
But	 by	 showing	 the	 limits	 and	 dangers	 of	
ill-designed	regional	 institutions,	 the	current	
crisis	 of	 European	 integration	 has	 dealt	 a	
blow	 to	 the	 belief	 that	 pooling	 sovereignty	
is	the	necessary	way	ahead	for	nation	states.	
Yet, political activity on a regional basis 
still commands a great deal of attention 
from	 chief	 executives	 and	 foreign	 policy	
elites	worldwide.	This	article	approaches	the	
evolution	 of	 regionalism	 with	 two	 aims	 in	
mind:	first,	to	clarify	key	concepts	and	refine	
analytical categories; and second, to apply 
these	concepts	and	categories	to	contemporary	
Latin	American	experiences	with	integration	
in	 order	 to	 evaluate	 their	 performance	 and	
prospects.
On	Concepts	and	
Paradigmatic	Debates
In	 the	 field	 of	 political	 science	 and	
international	 relations,	 two	 broad	 strands	 of	
literature	 have	 developed	 to	 account	 for	 the	
voluntary clustering of independent states into 
regional	groupings.	In	chronological	order,	the	
first	christened	its	subject	matter	as			regional	
integration	 	 	 and	 has	 focused	 mainly	 on	
Europe	since	the	late	1950s	(Haas	1958);	the	
second strand opted for a fuzzier label, namely 
regionalism,	and	since	the	1990s	has	focused	
on	 all	 continents	 	 though	 only	 marginally	
on	Europe	 (Hettne,	 Inotai	 and	Sunkel	1999:	
Hettne	 and	Söderbaum	1998).	The	 focus	on	
Europe	 of	 the	 former	 strand	 does	 not	mean	
that	 the	 forerunners	 of	 integration	 studies	
lacked	comparative	ambitions,	as	early	works	
on	Latin	America	show	(Haas	1967;	Haas	and	
Schmitter	1964);	rather,	integration	processes	
failed	to	take	root	and	were	only	consolidated	
in	Europe,	stagnating	or	receding	elsewhere.
The	 first	 problem	 faced	 by	 those	 who	
study comparative regional integration is 
not	 empirical	 or	 theoretical,	 but	 conceptual.	
Unlike	pioneering	masterpieces	such	as	those	
produced by Nye (1968), Claude (1971) or 
Lindberg (1963), too many contemporary 
studies	 suffer	 from	 conceptual	 stretching	 or	
fuzziness	 or	 both.	 Although	 most	 authors	
usually	 provide	 some	 kind	 of	 definition	 for	
the	phenomenon	 they	analyze,	 few	do	 so	 in	
a	satisfactory	manner.	Thus,	most	definitions	
are	either	too	vague	or	too	ambiguous.	Take,	
for	 example,	 the	 influential	 characterization	
by	 Hettne	 and	 Söderbaum	 (1998:	 7)	 “New	
regionalism	is	a	comprehensive,	multifaceted	
and multidimensional process, implying	 the	
change	 of	 a	 particular	 region	 from	 relative	
heterogeneity	to	increased	homogeneity	with	
regard	 to	a	number	of	dimensions,	 the	most	
important being culture, security, economic 
policies	 and	 political	 regimes”.	 	 In	 this	
definition,	analytical	categories	are	explicitly	
non-exhaustive,	implicitly	non-exclusive,		and	
are		not		ranked		by		precedence		or		hierarchy.	
This		cannot		plausibly		produce	measurable	
indicators		and		testable		hypotheses.		Hettne	
and	 Söderbaum	 (1998:	 	 9)	 further	 define	
regionalization as “increasing levels of 
“regionness”,	 namely	 the	 	 process	 whereby	
a	 geographical	 region is transformed from 
a	passive	object	 to	a	subject	with	a	capacity	
to	 articulate	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 emerging	
region  (emphasis	 added).	 Here,	 confusion	
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reaches	 new	 heights,	 as	 the	 word	 region is 
used simultaneously to connote objective 
geography	 and	 subjective	 interests,	 as	 well	
as	an	existing	object	and	an	emerging	entity.	
Hegels	 distinction	 between	 in sich and für 
sich is	a	wonderful	philosophical	insight,	but	
modern	scholarship	requires	different	names	
for	 different	 	 things,	 clear	 definitions	 and	
concepts	that	can	be	rendered	operational.
A	 way	 out	 of	 conceptual	 stretching	
and fuzziness consists of understanding 
contemporary regionalism as an umbrella 
expression	 that	 covers	 a	 multiplicity	 of	
distinct	 phenomena.	Andrew	Hurrell	 (1995)	
enumerates	 five	 of	 these,	 arguing	 that	 none	
should	 be	 given	 the	 exclusive	 rights	 to	 use	
the	 term:	 (a)	 regionalization,	 (b)	 regional	
awareness	and	identity,	(c)	regional	interstate	
cooperation, (d) state-promoted regional 
integration,	 and	 (e)	 regional	 cohesion.	 The	
first	 	 	 	 regionalization	 	 	 	 can	 be	 understood	
as	social	or	economic	interdependence,	which	
is	 usually	 the	 outcome	of	 informal,	market-	
driven	 processes.	 The	 	 second	 -	 regional	
identity	 -	 conveys	 	 a	 	 cultural	 	 rather	 	 than	
a	political	or	economic	notion.	The	common	
feature	of	both	phenomena	 is	 that	neither	 is	
necessarily	 intended	 but	 is	 brought	 about	
by	 uncoordinated	 factors-such	 as	 increasing	
trade	or	migration	flows	or	common	historical	
roots.	The	following	three	subtypes	respond	to	
a	different	logic:	they	are	either	the	outcome	
of formal state decisions cooperation and 
integration	or	a	consequence	of	such	decisions	
regional	cohesion.	While		cooperation	entails	
voluntary compliance, integration requires 
some	 degree	 of	 sovereignty	 transfer,	 which	
discourages	 unilateral	 with	 drawal	 and	
raises	the	costs	of	process	reversion.	In	these	
subtypes,	 Hurrell	 (1995:	 44)	 claims,	 “the	
region plays	 a	 defining	 role	 in	 the	 relations	
between	the	states	(and	other	major	actors)	of	
that	region	and	the	rest	of	the	world”,	while	
constituting	“the	organizing		basis		for		policy	
within		the		region  across  a  range  of issues” 
(emphasis		added).		This	definition	also	uses	
the	same	concept	simultaneously	for	an	actor	
and	an	arena:	here,	the	region “plays a role” 
regarding	 “policy	 within	 the	 region”. Such	
ubiquitous	confusion	is	arguably	rooted	in	the	
nominalization	 	of	 	 the	 	 adjective	 	regional. 
This	 	 word,	 	 however,	 indicates	 scope,	 not	
substance (Malamud	 2010:	 654).	 The	 latter	
should	 be	 conveyed	 by	 a	 noun,	 which	 can	
either	be	a	process	 (integration)	or	an	entity	
(organization).	 To	 give	 an	 example,	Europe 
is	an	intelligibly	but	highly	ambiguous	noun	
that	 should	 not	 be	 collapsed	with	 European	
integration	 or	 with	 the	 European	 Union.	 In	
these	 two	 expressions,	 “integration”	 and	
“union”	are	nouns	while	“European”	becomes	
an	adjective	that	delimits	a	particular	range	of	
otherwise	general	phenomena.
So	 what	 is	 regional	 integration?	
Regardless	of	time,	Haas`s	(1971:6)	definition	
is	 sufficiently	 clear	 and	 parsimonious	 to	
serve as a point of departure: a “process 
of	 how	 and	 why	 nation	 states	 voluntarily	
mingle,	merge	and	mix	with	 their	neighbors	
so	 as	 to	 lose	 the	 factual	 attributes	 of	
sovereignty	while	 acquiring	 new	 techniques	
for	 resolving	 conflicts	 among	 themselves”
To	 this,	 Schmitter	 (2004)	 has	 conveniently	
added, “by creating common and permanent, 
institutions	 capable	 of	 making	 decisions	
binding on all member” Contrary to common 
usage	in	Latin	American	politics,	where	after	
any	 international	 dispute	 statesmen	 rush	 to	
declare	 that	 “the	 conflict	 is	 over,	 now	 it	 is	
time	for	 integration”,the	opposite	of	conflict	
is not integration but cooperation. Actually, 
integration is just a subset of cooperation-
and	not	the	most	successful	or	even	the	most	
frequent. Nor is regional integration just 
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increasing		trade		flows		(aka		regionalization)	
or		the		various		manifestations		of		Deutsch	
et	 al	 conceptualization	 (1957)	 such	 as	
recurrent contacts among elites, facilitating 
communication	between	or	meetings	among	
people across national borders, or even 
promoting symbols of common identity.
Although	 there	 is	 nothing	 in	 the	 above	
definition	that	gives	the	economy	primacy	over	
other	domains,	the	fact	is	that	really	existing	
integration	 attempts	 have	 regularly	 adopted	
economic	 goals,	 whether	 efficiency	 gains	
through	benefits	of	scale	or	joint	development	
through	 cooperation	 and	 solidarity.	 As	
regards	the	market	dimension,		there	are	four	
progressive	 levels	 of	 achievement	 (Balassa	
1961).		The		simplest,		the		free-trade		zone, 
is		an		area		in		which		domestic		obstacles		to	
trade		are	dismantled;	this	means	that	customs	
tariffs	 are	 not	 imposed	 on	 the	 products	 of	
any member country. A customs union takes	
things	one	step	further:	at	this	stage	a	common	
external	tariff	is	established,	fixing	the	amount	
that	products	coming	from	the	rest	of	the	world	
have	to	pay	to	enter	the	area.	This	implies	that	
the	member	countries	form	a	single	entity	in	
the	arena	of	international	trade.	The	third	step,	
a common or single market, is a customs union 
to	which	the	free	mobility	of	productive	factors	
between	the	member	countries	and	a	common	
trade	 policy	 are	 added.	 It	 contemplates	 the	
coordination of sectoral macro-economic 
policies	among	its	members	and	requires	the	
harmonization	of	national	legislation.		Fourth,	
an  economic  union  appends  centralized 
monetary		institutions		and		common	financial	
policies	to	the	single	market.	It	goes	beyond	
simple	 coordination	 and	 harmonization	
among	 the	 member	 countries,	 and	 includes	
the	 establishment	 of	 unified	 supranational	
agencies	 	 	 	 such	 as	 a	 central	 bank	 	 	 	 and	 a	
single currency. Fiscal coordination is also 
required,	as	the	Euro	crisis	has	made	clear.
Regardless	 of	 the	 economic	 goals	
of	 regional	 integration,	 the	 necessity	 of	
establishing	some	kind	of	common	institutional	
arrangements	fosters	non-economic	linkages.	
Higher	 levels	 of	 state-promoted	 economic	
integration	are	likely	to	increase	flows	of	trade	
and	 investment,	 i.e.	 growing	 regionalization	
in	 the	 sense	 of	 the	 first	 subtype	 defined	
by	 Hurrell.	 Likewise,	 increasing	 flows	 of	
people and communications can nurture a 
regional	awareness,	as	in	the	second	subtype.	
Although	 none	 of	 these	 means	 regional	
integration	as	defined	above,	they	may	create	
further	demands	for	it,	a	mechanism	that	the	
neo-functionalist literature calls spillover.1 
Spillover	 is	 the	unintended	process	whereby	
integration	 between	 states	 in	 one	 sector	
creates	 incentives	 for	 integration	 in	 further	
sectors	in	order	to	fully	capture	the	benefits	of	
integration	in	the	original	sector.
Just	 like	 the	 development	 of	 capitalism	
and	the	emergence	of	the	bourgeoisie	created	
the	need	for	larger	markets,	which	in	turn	led	
to	 the	 consolidation	 of	 the	 nation-state,	 the	
effects of economic integration spill over into 
the	 political	 arena	 and	 foster	 new	 political	
centers	 that	 command	 authority	 over	 larger	
territories.	 This	 is	 why	 regional	 integration	
can	 be	 compared	 to	 the	 historical	 process	
of	 state	 building,	 even	 though	 the	 former	 is	
voluntary	 while	 the	 latter	 has	 seldom	 been	
so.	As	both	processes	aim	at	 the	creation	of	
a	 larger	 political	 community,	 they	 feature	 a	
common	 foundational	 nature.	 This	 stands	
in	 contrast	 to	 normal-time	 politics,	 when	
organizational apparatuses are devoted 
to	 daily	 administration.	 The	 EU	 case	 is	
illustrative: as it consolidated as a political 
1 Neofunctionalism is an approach that was 
originally developed by Ernst Haas (1958; 1964) 
to explain processes of international integration 
such as the European Coal and Steel Community 
and the International Labor Organization.
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community, its management gradually became 
“business	 as	 usual	 	 and	 the	 scholarly	 focus	
moved from integration to governance - and 
from international relations to comparative 
politics	 (Hix	 1994).	 Hence,	 the	 EU	 started	
to	be	compared	more	with	federal	states	and	
less	with	other	international	organizations.	As	
it	happened,	the	nature	of	the	beast	changed	
from polity-making	to policy-making. Lately, 
though,	the	Euro	crisis	has	re-equilibrated	the	
weight	of	the	two	dimensions.
Integration	 can	 develop	 in	 two	 ways.	
Negative	integration	refers	to	the	dismantling	
of	 national	 barriers	 on	 trade	 and	 the	
prohibition	 of	 discriminatory	 behavior,	
while	 positive	 integration	 implies	 common	
policies	 that	 shape	 the	 conditions	 under	
which	markets	operate	 (Scharpf	1996).	This	
distinction	 between	 market-creating	 and 
market-regulating	 functions	 is	 significant	
because	 the	 former	may	be	attained	 through	
intergovernmental	 proceedings,	 while	 the	
latter requires enforcement by supranational 
agencies and rules. Since negative and positive 
integration	 are	 generally	 sequential,	 the	 use	
of	 this	 criterion	 supports	 the	 view	 of	 those	
who	see	the	passage	of	intergovernmentalism	
to supranationalism as progressive over time; 
be	that	as	it	may,	progressive	does	not	mean	
irreversible.
Irrespective of its degree of formal 
supranationality, a regional organization may 
tend	 to	 privilege	 either	 	 the	 	 authority	 	 of	
impersonal		institutions		or		the		decision		of	
specific	 	 power-holders.	 	The	 orientation	 of	
a	given	organization	in	this	regard	is	more	a	
function	of	the	state-society	nexus	of	the	(larger)	
member	 states	 rather	 than	 of	 the	 regional	
constitution	or	legal	system	(Söderbaum	and	
Sbragia	2010).	The	consequence	is	that	some	
blocs may be mainly rule-oriented	 while	
others	remain	more	power-oriented.
A	 further	 distinction	 regards	 integration	
and	 convergence.	 The	 former	 means	 that	
member-states get ever closer,	 while	 the	
latter	conveys	they	become	more similar. As 
an	 example,	Greece	 is	more	 integrated	with	
Germany	e.g.	they	share	a	common	currency	
and	 military	 affiliation	 within	 NATO	 than	
Norway	 with	 Sweden,	 yet	 the	 latter	 pair	
features more similarities in political, 
economic,	 and	 social	 terms	 or	 in	 any	 other	
significant	indicators.
International organizations may perform 
three	 roles	 (Archer	 2001):	 they	 can	 serve	
as arenas for dialogue and cooperation, 
they	 can	 be	 used	 as	 instruments by	 other	
actors	 (especially	 their	 member	 states),	 and	
they	 can	 assume	 an	 independent	 identity	 as	
actors	in	pursuit	of	their	own	objectives		 	 	a	
property  called  actorness.	 	 These	 	 roles	
are	 	non-exclusive	 	and	 	convey	 	 increasing	
complexity.	Integration	only	starts	beyond	the	
second one.
There	 are	 three	 sets	 of	 conditions	 for	 a	
process of regional integration to develop: 
demand, supply (Mattli 1999), and inertial 
factors. Demand conditions emerge from 
higher	 levels	 of	 regional	 interdependence,	
as	 transnational	 transactors	 perceive	 that	
cross-border activities are too costly and call 
on	 national	 or	 supranational	 authorities	 to	
lower	transactions	costs	through	cooperation,	
coordination and, eventually, integration. 
Supply	conditions	refer	to	regional	leadership,	
understood	as	the	capacity	and	will	of	one	or	
more	 actors	 either	 to	pay	a	disproportionate	
share	of	 the	costs	 required	by	 	 the	 	 regional	
undertaking	 	 or	 	 to	 	 undertake	 	monitoring,	
enforcement	 	 and	 	 brokerage.	 	 Inertial	
conditions	take	the	form	of	demand	or	supply	
conditions	 that	 become	 institutionalized,	
locking	in	previous	agreements	and	creating	
path-dependent	 effects	 that	 may	 protect	
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integration processes in times of declining 
demand or supply conditions    but may also 
make	them	too	rigid.
Although	some	could	judge	the	arguments	
presented	 so	 far	 as	Euro-centric,	 the	 goal	 is	
precisely	 the	 opposite:	 to	 provide	 tools	 to	
understand	regionalism	in	different	world	areas	
without	either	equalizing	them	or	considering	
them	incommensurable.	Integration	should	be	
understood as,
	 	 “a	 potentially	 global	 phenomenon,	
and	 thus	 one	 that	 should	 be	 recognized	
whenever	 it	 appears.	 This	 calls	 for	
standard	definitions	 	and	 theory	 that	can	
travel.	Think	of	democracy:	 there	are	as	
many	types	thereof	as	there	are		countries	
in	 which	 citizens	 are	 formally	 equal	
and	 rulers	 are	 accountable;	 yet,	 lacking	
these	 characteristics,	we	 do	 not	 call	 it	 a	
democracy.	The	same	applies	to	regional	
integration:	 	 either	 there	 are	 sovereign	
states		that		voluntarily		transfer		parcels	
of	 sovereignty	 to	 joint	 decision-making	
or	 there	 are	 not,	 and	 in	 this	 case	we	 do	
not	 call	 it	 integration.	We	 have	 resisted	
the	 temptation	 to	 stretch	 conceptual	
definitions	or	dispose	of	working	theories	
when	a	given	phenomenon	does	not	turn	
out	as	expected,	as	long	as	those	concepts	
and	 theories	 are	 capable	 of	 explaining	
why	this	happened.	EU	lessons	are	useful	
to	 understand	 South	 American	 travails	
with	 regional	 integration	 precisely	
because	they	can	also	make	sense	of	non-
integration-	instead	of	calling	it	otherwise	
and	 pretending	 that	 it	 is	 a	 new	 animal”	
(Malamud	and	Schmitter	2011:	155).
Since	 geographic	 vicinity	 is	 constant,	
neighborhood	 spillovers	 are	 unavoidable	
and	 their	 joint	 management	 appears	 as	 a	
reasonable	 goal.	 However,	 the	 means	 for	
achieving	 it	 are	 diverse	 and	 not	 determined	
by	 	 historical	 	 legacies	 	 or	 	 globalization	
pressures.  In  recent  years,  different  forms 
of	regional	interaction	other	than	integration	
have	 developed	 worldwide,	 and	 several	
approaches	 were	 developed	 that	 replicated	
the	complexification	of	reality	with	fuzziness	
and	ambiguity	at	the	analytical	level.	But	our	
analytical	 categories	 have	 fizzled	 out	 and	
are	failing	 to	call	 things	by	 their	name.	 It	 is	
time to call a spade a spade, to streamline our 
conceptual	toolkit	and	apply	it	to	the	empirical	
field.
On	Latin	America`s	Obsession	
with	Regionalism	and	
Misadventures	with	Integration
Latin American attempts at regionalism 
have	 never	 converged	 into	 a	 single	 project.	
The	 first	 wave,	 following	 the	 Western	
European	experiment	with	coal	and	steel	and	
either	 supported	 or	 neglected	 by	 the	United	
States,	included	two	mutually	exclusive	blocs:	
the	 Central	American	 Common	Market	 and	
the	 Latin	American	 Free	 Trade	Association	
(ALALC).2	 Subsequent	 experiences	 as	 the	
Andean	 Community	 and	 the	 Caribbean	
Community (CARICOM) also included small 
subsets of countries, giving rise to a long-
lasting	patchwork	of	segmented	regionalisms.	
Today,	 there	 are	 a	 few	 associations	 that	
encompasses several subregional blocs or 
even	 the	 whole	 subcontinent,	 such	 as	 the	
Union	of	South	American	States	(UNASUR)	
and	 the	 Community	 of	 Latin	American	 and	
Caribbean	 States	 (CELAC);	 but	 the	 former	
brings	together	only	half	of	the	Latin	American	
states	 while	 the	 latter	 lacks	 legal	 status,	
2 Both organizations were founded in 1960. CACM 
initially brought together El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua but soon expanded to 
include Costa Rica, while ALALC comprised 11 states: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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organizational structure and institutional 
authority.
UNASUR is a Brazil-sponsored regional 
cooperation agreement, masterminded for 
the	unspoken	goal	of	carving	out	a	Brazilian	
sphere	of	influence	by	cutting	off	US	influence	
and	 offsetting	 Mexican	 competition	 for	
leadership.	It	contemplates	the	promotion	of	
physical	integration	through	transport,	energy	
and		communication		networks,		but		it		does	
not  envision  any  transfer  of  sovereignty. 
Accordingly,	 it	 should	 be	 considered	 as	
a tool for top-level dialogue and political 
coordination, but not an integration attempt.
Latin	America:	Segmented	Regionalism
From top left, by row: (1) the Americas, (2) Latin America, (3) ALBA, (4) North America (NAFTA), (5) Central America (SICA), 
(6) South America (UNASUR), (7) Mercosur, (8) Andean Community, and (9) Pacific Alliance. Source: Malamud and Gardini 
(2012: 122).
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Although	 CELAC	 acts	 as	 the	 EU	
counterpart	 in	 EU-Latin	 America	 and	 the	
Caribbean	meetings,	which	bring	together	60	
states	(27	European	plus	33	from	LAC),	the	
fact	 is	 that	 these	meetings	 long	 predated	 its	
creation.	CELAC	 is	 a	 hollow	 container	 that	
regional	powers	use	to	signal	policy	positions	
or	 to	wave	ideological	banners	such	as	anti-
American	sentiment	or	South-South	solidarity.	
It is also one more arena for states to trade 
their	differences	and	for	head	of	governments	
to	build	mutual	 trust,	but	 it	 is	not	 -	 and	has	
no prospects of becoming - an international 
actor. And, to be sure, nor is it an integration 
project.
In	 the	 last	 decade,	 a	 	 further	 	 type	 of	
regionalism	purportedly	has	been	 identified:	
post-liberal	 or	 post-hegemonic	 regionalism	
(Sanahuja	 2009;	 Riggirozzi	 and	 Tussie	
2012).	 The	 argument	 is	 that	 the	 new	
construct	 has	 shifted	 the	 focus	 away	 from	
economics	 and,	 by	 lambasting	 the	 failure	
of neo-liberal reforms,  features  a  more 
ideological	 	 (aka	 	 progressive)	 	 stance.	
Policy  coordination  and  common identities 
come	 to	 the	 fore	 as	 market	 and	 investment	
relations	 recede.	 The	 topmost	 examples	 of	
this	kind	o	regionalism	are	UNASUR	and	the	
Venezuelan-sponsored	 Bolivarian	 Alliance	
for	 the	 Peoples	 of	 our	 America	 (ALBA).	
These	 undertakings	 discursively	 reject	 the	
neo-functionalist	 premise	 that	 integration	 is	
driven	 by	 a	 convergence	 of	 interests	 rather	
than	 ideological	 commonalities.	However,	 a	
backlash	 is	 underway,	 as	 Chile,	 Colombia,	
Peru	 and	 Mexico	 have	 signed	 a	 treaty	 to	
establish	a	Pacific	Alliance	that	-once	again-	
puts	the	economy	first.	Its	goal	is	to	foster	free	
trade	 and	 market	 integration	 in	 opposition	
to	 the	 ideological	 radicalization	 of	 Latin	
American regionalism (Malamud and Gardini 
2012:	120).	Yet,	this	grouping	has	a	political	
impact	 worth	 considering	 as	 it	 challenges	
into	the	region,	out-performing	Mercosur	and	
diluting UNASUR.
The	segmented	nature	of	Latin	American	
regionalism	 is	 not	 always	 competitive	 but	
frequently	 overlapping,	 as	 shown	 by	 the	
figure	attached.	Of	the	nine	blocs	featured	in	
the	maps,	one	feature	stands	out:
“not one country participates in at least 
half	 of	 them.	 In	 the	 Western	 hemisphere,	
regionalism	is	always	sub-regional	and	there	
is	 no	 common	 core	 or	 political	 centre.	 The	
reality	is	that,	every	time	a	new	bloc	is	born,	it	
does	so	by	excluding	neighbouring	countries	
and by intentionally differentiating itself from 
other	 (sub)regional	organisations.	Decentred	
sub-regionalisms	 rather	 than	 	 concentric	
regionalism	 has	 	 been	 	 the	 	 end-product	
of	 	 such	 	 logic,	 	 by	 	 which	 	 sub-regional	
integration	 proceeds	 through	 regional	 or	
hemispheric	 disintegration”	 (Malamud	 and	
Gardini 2012:120).
As	 argued	 above,	 integration	 was	 not	
pursued	 by	 all	 these	 regional	 undertakings,	
but	 it	 was	 explicitly	 promised	 by	 some	 of	
them.	 However,	 it	 has	 not	 been	 delivered	
by	any	of	 them	-	barring	partial	and	usually	
reversed	achievements.	The	case	of	Mercosur,	
which	used	to	be	seen	as	the	most	successful	
and	promising	experience	of	Latin	American	
integration, offers an eloquent illustration of 
the	transformations	brought	about	by	meager	
results	and	changing	goals.
If	 the	 success	 of	 an	 organization	 is	
measured	 by	 the	 attainment	 of	 the	 goals	
established	 in	 its	 treaties,	 Mercosur	 is	 an	
outright	 failure.	 After	 more	 than	 twenty	
years,	it	is	neither	a	common	market	nor	even	
a	customs	union.	Worse,	it	does	not	work	as	
an effective free trade zone, since unilateral 
tariff	restrictions	are	erected	at	will	and	non-
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tariff	barriers	 abound.	Chile	has	not	 applied	
for	 membership	 as	 the	 founders	 expected,	
and	 chains	 of	 value	 and	 regional	 industrial	
complexes	 have	 only	 developed	 outside	 the	
scope	 of	 the	 treaties	 -	 as	 in	 the	 automobile	
sectoral	 agreement	 between	Argentina	 	 and	
Brazil.	 	 It	 	 would	 	 be	 	 unfair	 	 to	 	 ignore	
that	 	 Mercosur	 	 has	 	 accomplished	 	 other	
commendable	 goals	 such	 as	 facilitating	 the	
transitions	to	democracy,	locking	in	domestic	
economic reforms and consolidating a regional 
security	community.	But	these	did	not	require	
the	transfer	of	sovereignty	and	can	therefore	
be	regarded	as	the	result	of	cooperation	rather	
than	integration.
One	 of	 the	 few	 aspects	 that	 makes	
Mercosur	 look	 as	 if	 it	 works	 is	 legal	
international	 actorness.	 Unlike	 the	 Andean	
Community,	 fifteen	 years	 after	 they	 began,	
Mercosur	 is	 still	negotiating	with	 the	EU	as	
a	bloc.	However,	 it	 is	Brazil	on	its	own	that	
sits	 at	 top	 international	 tables	 such	 as	 the	
BRICS (largest emerging economies), IBSA 
(largest	 Southern	 hemisphere	 democracies),	
BASIC (emerging economies environmental 
coalition),	 and	 the	 WTO	 4-party	 final-
negotiations	group,	not	to	speak	of	its	bid	to	
occupy a permanent seat in a reformed UN 
Security	 Council	 against	 Argentina`s	 will	
(Malamud 2011).
Finally,	the	only	case	of	enlargement	has	
led	to	a	political	conflict	over	the	suspension	
of	 Paraguay	 to	 allow	 the	 ratification	 of	
Venezuela`s	 accession.	 The	 rift	 created	 a	
legal	 limbo	 regarding	 the	 status	 of	 the	 two	
members	 and	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 legislation	
decided	during	the	exclusion	of	Paraguay,	as	
this	 contradicts	 the	 unanimity	 decision	 rule	
and	 therefore	 puts	 into	 question	 Paraguay`s	
future	commitment	to	abide	by	the	rules.
Mercosur is a case of supply-side 
integration,	as	the	political	decision	to	establish	
the	 organization	 was	 not	 made	 in	 response	
to previous economic interdependence or 
societal	demands.	Its	key	working	mechanism	
has	 been	 called	 interpresidentialism,	
meaning	 the	 outcome	 of	 combining	 an	
international strategy,  namely  presidential 
diplomacy,	 	 with	 	 a	 	 domestic	 	 institution,	
namely  presidentialism (Malamud 2005a). 
Presidential	 diplomacy	 is	 the	 customary	
use	 of	 direct	 negotiations	 between	 national	
presidents	rather	than	professional	diplomats	
every	time	a	crucial	decision	has	to	be	made	
or	 a	 critical	 conflict	 needs	 to	 be	 solved.	 In	
turn,	 presidentialism	 South	 American	 style	
grants	 chief	 executives	 the	 power	 to	 strike	
deals	 without	 seeking	 approval	 by	 either	
parliaments	or	cabinets.	The	consequence	of	
this	 combination	 is	 that	Mercosur	 has	 been	
power-oriented	rather	than	rule-oriented	from	
its inception.
Accordingly,	 the	 legalization	 or	 judicia-
lization	 of	 the	 bloc`s	 procedures	 is	 nothing	
more	than	a	myth.		Its		top		dispute	settlement	
institutions	have		been	called	upon	16	times	
in 20  years.  Legal institution-building, as 
manifested	 by	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 so-
called	 Permanent	 Review	Tribunal	 in	 2006,	
was	not	undertaken	in	response	to	functional	
needs	but	 	 rather	because	of	 the	pressure	of	
epistemic  communities  and  transnational 
networks:	 	 blunt	 	 simplification	 -	 jobs	 	 for	
lawyers		(and	judges)			serves	to	convey	the	
point.
Likewise,	 the	 development	 of	 a	
parliamentary	institution	has	been	an	outcome	
of professional lobbying by academics and 
national	 lawmakers,	 but	 also	 a	 legitimizing	
resource	born	out	of	mimicry	and	isomorphism	
(Rüland	and	Bechle	2011).	The	marketplace	
of	 ideas	 about	 regional	 integration	 is	 much	
limited	 to	 a	 single	 successful	 source,	 the	
EU.	 In	 fact,	 Parlasur	 has	 no	 legislative	
55Andrés Malamud
tariff	barriers	 abound.	Chile	has	not	 applied	
for	 membership	 as	 the	 founders	 expected,	
and	 chains	 of	 value	 and	 regional	 industrial	
complexes	 have	 only	 developed	 outside	 the	
scope	 of	 the	 treaties	 -	 as	 in	 the	 automobile	
sectoral	 agreement	 between	Argentina	 	 and	
Brazil.	 	 It	 	 would	 	 be	 	 unfair	 	 to	 	 ignore	
that	 	 Mercosur	 	 has	 	 accomplished	 	 other	
commendable	 goals	 such	 as	 facilitating	 the	
transitions	to	democracy,	locking	in	domestic	
economic reforms and consolidating a regional 
security	community.	But	these	did	not	require	
the	transfer	of	sovereignty	and	can	therefore	
be	regarded	as	the	result	of	cooperation	rather	
than	integration.
One	 of	 the	 few	 aspects	 that	 makes	
Mercosur	 look	 as	 if	 it	 works	 is	 legal	
international	 actorness.	 Unlike	 the	 Andean	
Community,	 fifteen	 years	 after	 they	 began,	
Mercosur	 is	 still	negotiating	with	 the	EU	as	
a	bloc.	However,	 it	 is	Brazil	on	its	own	that	
sits	 at	 top	 international	 tables	 such	 as	 the	
BRICS (largest emerging economies), IBSA 
(largest	 Southern	 hemisphere	 democracies),	
BASIC (emerging economies environmental 
coalition),	 and	 the	 WTO	 4-party	 final-
negotiations	group,	not	to	speak	of	its	bid	to	
occupy a permanent seat in a reformed UN 
Security	 Council	 against	 Argentina`s	 will	
(Malamud 2011).
Finally,	the	only	case	of	enlargement	has	
led	to	a	political	conflict	over	the	suspension	
of	 Paraguay	 to	 allow	 the	 ratification	 of	
Venezuela`s	 accession.	 The	 rift	 created	 a	
legal	 limbo	 regarding	 the	 status	 of	 the	 two	
members	 and	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 legislation	
decided	during	the	exclusion	of	Paraguay,	as	
this	 contradicts	 the	 unanimity	 decision	 rule	
and	 therefore	 puts	 into	 question	 Paraguay`s	
future	commitment	to	abide	by	the	rules.
Mercosur is a case of supply-side 
integration,	as	the	political	decision	to	establish	
competences,	 no	 oversight	 capacities,	 is	
not	 demographically	 proportional,	 and	 has	
virtually no transnational party politics.
The	distinctiveness	of	Mercosur	vis-à-vis	
other	regional	projects	such	as	UNASUR	or	
ALBA continues to be its treaty-based focus 
on	 market	 issues.	 Yet,	 few	 advances	 have	
been made regarding policy coordination and 
harmonization,	 and	 the	 threshold	 between	
cooperation	 and	 integration	has	 been	hardly	
crossed.	 The	 only	 discipline	 that	 the	 bloc	
has	 effectively	 imposed	 upon	 its	 members	
is	 the	 prohibition	 to	 unilaterally	 sign	 trade	
agreements,	a	competence	that	was	transferred	
to	 the	 regional	 level	 	 	 	 only	 to	 be	 gloomily	
underutilized.
The	main	reason	for	this	underachievement	
was	identified	a	decade	ago,	in	what	remains	
the	 most	 in-depth	 analysis	 of	 the	 bloc	 to	
date.	 In	 the	 view	 of	 its	 authors,	Mercosur`s	
underlying formula, i.e. preferential  access 
to		the		Brazilian		market		in		exchange		for	
Argentine  support  for  Brazilian international 
strategies	(Bouzas	et	al	2002),	has	exhausted	
and	 never	 replaced	 its	 fuel.	Thus,	Mercosur	
acquired	a	different	meaning	for	each	member	
state,	 and	 national	 strategies	 have	 become	
disparate	rather	than	coordinated.
For Brazil, Mercosur no longer performs 
a	 significant	 economic	 role,	 as	 extra-
regional partners dominate trade relations 
and regional investment is agreed bilaterally 
with	 each	 neighbor.	 Somewhat	 ironically,	
both		progressive		activists		such		as		Samuel	
Pinheiro		Guimarães		(2012)		and		pragmatic	
analysts	 	 such	 	 as	Alfredo	 Valladao	 (2006)	
agree	 that	 Brazil`s	 promotion	 of	 UNASUR	
imperils	Mercosur`s	objetives	and	operation.	
However,	 the	 latter	 also	 serves	 a	 political	
purpose:	 to	 help	 manage	 relations	 with	
Argentina,	 the	 only	 regional	 country	 that	
could	 seriously	 challenge	 or	 hinder	Brazil`s	
global projection.3
By	 contrast,	 Mercosur	 has	 economic	
significance	for	Argentina	insofar	as	Brazil	is	
its	 largest	 trading	 partner	 (for	Brazil,	China	
and	the	US	are	larger	partners	than	Argentina).	
However,	 cars	 are	 the	 key	 commercial	 link	
between	the	two	countries,	the	trade	in	which	
is covered by an administered trade regime 
that	falls	outside	the	free	trade	zone.	Argentina	
also	 uses	 the	 bloc	 for	 unspoken	 political	
goals	 such	as	 tying	Brazil	 to	 the	 region	and	
preventing it from doing business or going 
global alone.
Former Brazilian foreign minister Celso 
Lafer	 once	 said	 that,	 for	 Brazil,	 negotiating	
the	 Free	 Trade	 Area	 of	 the	 Americas	 was	
an	 option	 while	 Mercosur	 was	 its	 destiny.	
Paraphrasing	Lafer,	it	could	be	said	that,	for	
Paraguay, Mercosur is not its destiny but its 
doom:	unavoidable,	though	not	necessarily	a	
good	 thing.	 Landlocked,	 the	 country	 cannot	
afford	to	be	left	out	of	an	association	in	which	
its	two	coastal	neighbors	participate.	And	yet	
its	 recent	 suspension	 from	 the	 bloc	 because	
of	an	alleged	coup	puts	it	in	the	worst	of	two	
worlds:	 it	pays	 the	club`sS	dues	but	gets	no	
perks	of	membership.
By	 	having	 	direct	 	 access	 	 to	 	 the	 	 sea,	
Uruguay  is  less  dependent  on  Mercosur 
than	 	 Paraguay.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 country`s	
birth	 as	 a	 buffer	 state	 still	 resonates	 in	 the	
present, and offending any of its larger 
neighbors	 by	 leaving	 the	 bloc	 could	 set	 off	
painful retaliations. Because leaving can 
be	 costlier	 than	 staying,	 strategic	 patience	
and	 institutional	 inertia	 have	 carried	 the	
day.	 Additionally,	 the	 current	 left-of-center	
administration	tends	to	stand	up	for	the	bloc	
on ideological grounds.
3 As suggested by Alfredo Valladão at the 
conference “Mercosur at 20: Politics and 
Economics in the Southern Cone Latin American 
Centre, University of Oxford, 11th March 2011.
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After	 six	 years	 of	 standoff,	 Venezuelan	
membership	was	finally	approved	for	reasons	
of	 political	 expedience,	 as	 the	 suspension	
of	 Paraguay	 by	 decision	 of	 three	 foreign	
presidents (i.e. Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay)	 substituted	 for	 the	 congressional	
ratification	 of	 the	 accession	 protocol.	
However,	 as	 a	 few	 days	 later	 the	 Senate	
turned	the	protocol	down,	Venezuela`s	status	
might	remain	controversial	once	Paraguay	is	
readmitted. In any case, for an economy as 
uncompetitive	as	the	Venezuelan	the	rationale	
for	 belonging	 to	 the	 bloc	 is	 not	 related	 to	
trade	 but	 to	 the	 international	 legitimization	
of its “revolutionary regime” and to stave off 
perceived	threats	from	the	US.
In	sum,	Mercosur	is	not	what	it	purports	to	
be	in	the	official	discourse;	rather,	it	is	several	
different	 things	depending	on	who	 is	 asked.	
Its	balance	sheet	is	positive	given	the	indirect	
effects	 of	 upholding	 domestic	 democracy	
and	 the	 peaceful	 resolution	 of	 conflicts,	 but	
the	 gap	 between	words	 and	 deeds	may	 end	
up	 definitely	 damaging	 its	 reputation	 and	
jeopardizing	 its	 usefulness.	 Should	 empty	
rhetoric	 definitely	 gain	 the	 upper	 hand,	
Mercosur	 may	 survive	 but	 serve	 no	 further	
collective	 purpose.	 Indeed,	 really	 existing	
regional	 integration	 is	 not	what	 it	was	 once	
thought	to	be.
Conclusions
In	Latin	America,	regionalism	has	evolved	
through	 segmented	 proliferation	 rather	 than	
enlargement,	and	through	goal-transformation	
rather	 than	 goal-attainment.	 The	 reasons	
for	 these	 unexpected	 developments	 can	 be	
summarized	as	follows.
First,  economic  facts  trump  political 
will.	 	 National	 	 economies	 	 are	 	 non-
complementary	 	 and	 outward-oriented,	
imposing	 a	 low	 ceiling	 on	 potential	 gains	
from	 integration	 	 	 	 as	 Burges	 (2005)	 has	
shown.	Might	 any	 institutional	 arrangement	
compensate	for	this	shortcoming?
The	 answer	 to	 the	 above	 question	 is	
negative,	 as	 form	 has	 trumped	 function.	
Institutional	 deficits	 as	 in	 MERCOSUR	 or	
institutional precociousness or “surplus”  as 
in	CAN	have	prevented	 functional	 spillover	
from	 taking	 place	 (Malamud	 and	 Schmitter	
2011).	So	what	about	pragmatic	fixes?
These	 fixes	 have	 not	 worked	 either,	 as	
ideology	has	gradually	trumped	pragmatism.	
Departing from its initial simplicity, 
Mercosur,	which	had	originally	learned	more	
lessons	 from	 the	CAN	failure	 than	 from	 the	
EU	success,	has	increasingly	become	largely	
rhetorical	 (Malamud	 2005b;	 Doctor	 2012).	
As	 the	 results	 show,	 though,	 programmatic	
affinity	 and	 identity	 politics	 is	 no	 substitute	
for	the	convergence	of	interests.
Today`s	 landscape	 of	 Latin	 American	
integration	looks	like	Jean	Monnet`s	blueprint	
upside	down:	rather	than	“petits	pas,	grands	
effets” the	reality	reflects	“grands	mots,	petits	
effets” why	 talk	 but	 about	 integration	 if	 it	
does not deliver?
For some groups and observers, regional 
organizations	 -	 especially	 Mercosur	 -	 have	
become	an	existential	end	per se rather	than	a	
means	to	an	end.	Just	as	citizens	are	expected	to	
defend	their	country		without		questioning		its	
raison	d`etre,	inchoate		regional		identity		rather	
than		interests		or	reasoning	are	frequently	at	
the	root	of	the	defense	of	regional	would-be	
polities - a suggestive constructivist turn. For 
others,	usually	including	scholars,	politicians	
and bureaucrats, regional organizations offer 
attractive	 opportunities	 to	 make	 a	 living:	 a	
new	 discipline	 for	 scholarly	 specialization,	
good  salaries  in  region-funded  contracts, 
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academic	 	 and	 	political	 	 tourism,	 	 and	 	 the	
prestige of belonging to a small group of 
iniziati.	 In	 this	 case,	 it	 is	 not	 identity	 or	
advantage arising from dismantling state 
borders	but	rather	particularistic	interests	that	
lie	 behind	 the	 defense	 of	 regionalism.	 For	
their	 part,	 statesmen	 know	 that	 sovereignty	
is	not	relinquished	by	signing	papers	so	they	
are	free	to	continue	to	establish	and	relaunch	
regional	 organizations	 without	 integrating	
anything,	 and	 they	 can	 use	 regionalism	 as	
a	 foreign	 policy	 resource	 to	 achieve	 other	
ends	such	as	international	visibility,	regional	
stability	and	regime	legitimacy	(Merke	2010;	
Spektor	2010).
Expressions	 such	 as	 “token	 integration`	
(Nye 1968: 377), “ceremonial regionalism” 
(Montesinos	 1996),	 and	 integration-fiction	
(Peña	1996)	have	been	coined	to	portray	Latin	
American	integration,	with	its	combination	of	
high-toned	rhetoric	and	dismal	performances.	
It	 often	 seems	 that	 decision-	 makers	 and	
their	 followers	want	 to	 talk	 integration	 into	
existence.	However	absurd	 this	may	appear,	
this	behavior	is	far	from	unreasonable,	since	
politicians	 know	 that	 praising	 integration	
gets	 them	 support,	 while	 actually	 engaging	
in	it	would	have	material	costs.	Thus,	talking	
without	 doing	 is	 not	 necessarily	 a	 sign	 of	
corruption, ignorance or cultural atavism: 
given	the	dim	conditions	for	Latin	American	
integration, it is simply a rational decision.
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Rüland,	 Jürgen	 and	 Karsten	 Bechle	 (2011)	
“Defending State-Centric Regionalism 
through	 Mimicry	 and	 Localization:	
Regional	 Parliamentary	 Bodies	 in	 the	
Association	 of	 Southeast	 Asian	 Nations	
(ASEAN) and Mercosur” Occasional 
Paper N°2,	Southeast	Asian	Studies	at	the	
University of Freiburg.
Sanahuja,	 José	 Antonio	 (2009)	 “Del	
regionalismo abierto al regionalismo post-
liberal. Crisis y cambio en la integración 
regional en América Latina”, Anuario de la 
Integración Regional de América Latina y 
el	Gran	Caribe, 7: 12-54.
Scharpf,	Fritz	W.	(1996)	“Negative	and	Positive	
Integration	 in	 the	 Political	 Economy	 of	
European	Welfare	States”,	in	Gary	Marks,	
Fritz	 W.	 Scharpf,	 Philippe	 C.	 Schmitter	
and	 Wolfgang	 Streeck:	 Governance	
in the European Union. London: Sage 
Publications.
Schmitter,	 	 Philippe	 C.	 (2004)	 “Neo-
Neofunctionalism”, in Antje Wiener and 
Thomas	 Diez,	 eds:	 European Integration 
Theory.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	
45-74.
Söderbaum,	Fredrik	and	Alberta	Sbragia	(2010)	
“EU	 Studies	 and	 the	 New	 Regionalism:	
What	 can	 be	 Gained	 from	 Dialogue?”,	
Journal of European Integration, 32(6): 
563-82.
Spektor,	 Matías	 (2010)	 “ideas	 	 de	 	 ativismo	
regional:	 	 a	 	 transformação	 	 das	 	 leituras	
brasileiras	 da	 região”;	 Revista Brasileira 
de Política Internacional, 53 (1): 25-44.
Valladão,	 Alfredo	 G.A:	 (2006)	 “Brazil:	 An	
Ambiguous Leader”, prepared for GIGA 
Conference	 on	 Regional	 Powes	 in	 Asia,	
Africa,	Latin	America	and	the	Middle	East,	
Hamburg,	11-12	December.
IMPRESO EN LOS
TALLERES DE PROCOIN
GUATEMALA DICIEMBRE 2018
600 EJEMPLARES

